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Informed by the investigative thrust of phenomenological inquiry and the ‘phenomenology of 
intersubjectivity’, the overarching aim of this article is to provide an accurate illumination of the 
experience of being diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder, and thus being ‘a labelled individual’.  This 
article is based on research that sought to understand the impact of the psychiatric label upon labelled 
individuals interpersonal and intersubjective presence as experienced outside the psychiatric institution.  
The principle question asked was:  “What is the experience of being a labelled individual in the world?”.  
It was discovered that psychiatric labelling unfolds as a disconnection and dislocation from co-existence 
with others.  Moreover, labelling had the effect of robbing such individuals of their subjectivity, rendering them 




The overarching aim of this article is to document the 
experience of being labelled with a psychiatric 
diagnosis or disorder such as schizophrenia or bi-
polar disorder.  The intention is to discover how such 
labelling may or may not have an impact on to the 
mutual presencing of self to other.  In this regard, the 
primary questions asked were:  “What is the 
experience of being a labelled individual in the 
world?”,  “What does the label mean for the person 
labelled, and how does the labelled individual 
understand that meaning, and respond to that meaning 
in his or her lived-world?”.  The conceptual 
framework used is phenomenology, with particular 
attention paid to the ‘phenomenology of 
intersubjectivity’ and the construction of the so-called 
‘diagnostic object’.   
The anti-psychiatrists of the 1950s, 60s and 70s such 
as Goffman (1968), Laing (1967, 1982), Rosenhan 
(1992), and Szasz (1961, 1973) focussed their 
energies upon the impact of the psychiatric 
institution.  These writers aimed at a deconstruction 
of the inhumanities which characterised the 
functioning of the institution.  The essential thrust of 
this article, based on qualitative research methods, is 
to document the experiences of those labelled with a 
psychiatric disorder who live outside rather than 
inside the psychiatric institution. 
The psychiatric label emerges within the psychiatric 
endeavour as an unequivocal description of the 
individual’s mental state (Bradfield, 2001, 2003; 
Kiesler, 2000).  This description effects diagnosed 
individuals’ consciousness and their sense of self was 
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disclosed as an experience of dehumanisation thereby 
translating their consciousness into a ‘scientific fact’ 
(Bradfield, 2002, 2003; Goodwin & Guze, 1996).  In 
this sense, the label eclipses personal identity.  In 
rendering consciousness wholly definable from within 
the confinement that is the label, labelled individuals 
find they are only present to the world as a 
schizophrenic or a bipolar and are unable to recreate 
themselves beyond their diagnostic partition.  They 
are thus dehumanised insofar as they have been 
robbed of their potential for regeneration and 
transcendence (Bradfield, 2002, 2003).  
The phenomenology of intersubjectivity 
The construct of intersubjectivity or the presencing of 
self to other (Reeder, 1998) constitutes the 
exploratory focus of this article.  Intersubjectivity 
emerges within the lived-world as an a priori 
imperative, operating as foundational in situating the 
self in relation to others.  Intersubjectivity is disclosed 
most basically as the relation of a subjectivity to the 
world in and through which that subjectivity exists.  It 
implies an interconnectedness of self, the world of 
things and others.  “Intersubjectivity can be defined as 
the  intersection of two or more subjectivities” 
(Schulte, 2000, p. 531). 
We now proceed with an explication of 
intersubjectivity as it is grasped phenomenologically, 
as a mode of being and as an existential potentiality.  
Who are others-in-the-world?   What is their position 
in relation to myself as a being-in-the-world?  As one 
within the world how do I find myself amongst 
others?  Is my presence in relation to others an 
ontological imperative, or do I decide for myself 
whether or not I will have relations with others?  
Luijpen (1969) conceptualised intersubjectivity as an 
existential imperative which brings the self into 
existence as a self.  Luijpen asserts the notion that 
being entirely exclusive of others is an existential 
impossibility. 
“No aspect of man’s being-man is what it is without 
the ‘presence’ of other men in it.  The presence of 
others in my existence implies that my being is a 
being through others” (Luijpen, 1969, p.  261-2).  
Luijpen’s account of the phenomenology of 
intersubjectivity emerges as an existential imperative 
in which all individuals exist necessarily through and 
in relation to others.  As a self amongst other selves I 
am brought into awareness of myself through my 
awareness of my self-other relatedness.  To exist as a 
self amongst others is to co-exist  (Luijpen, 1969).  
My existence, grasped as the project of my being, is 
at the same time the project of my world.  That which 
I am in my existing and my becoming is meaningful 
only through my relation to the world which houses 
that becoming.  Existence, suggests Luijpen, unfolds 
as authentic only if individuals find themselves 
amongst others with whom they co-existence.  This 
perception of self with other, in which two or more 
subjectivities see themselves as belonging within a 
shared world as co-existents, is given 
phenomenologically as a mutual revelation of self to 
other and other to self (Schulte, 2000).  This 
reciprocal disclosure of selves unfolds as a “mutual 
gaze” (Schulte, p.  536) indicating the mutual 
implication of subject and world, in which both are 
present to the other as indications of what the one is 
in relation to the other.  At this intersubjective 
meeting-place, self is present to world as a co-
revelation of likeness; and world meets self, echoing 
what that self is for itself. 
A core element of the phenomenology of 
intersubjectivity is the simple fact of existential 
companionship disclosed through mutual recognition 
of self and other.   It is suggested that through the 
likeness, self and other emerge as present to one 
another in the mode of companionship.  In terms of 
the exploration of intersubjectivity as it is disclosed in 
the lebenswelt, companionship with an other unfolds 
as a self-world-relatedness dialogue.  In this sense, I 
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am enabled to conceive of myself only through the 
world with which I, as a co-existing subjectivity, 
share my being and my becoming. Conversely, 
through my being in a social, cultural, historical and 
temporal space, I bring that space into existence as a 
world, occupied by, and co-created by myself and 
others, with whom I share a likeness in being.  
Luijpen describes this intersubjective partaking within 
the world in terms of the relation of an independent 
“I” to an independent “You”, both of whom 
appropriate their own worlds individually, and yet 
both of whom exist through the other in that 
appropriation as companions within a lived-world.  
The world in which I live is not a world which I can 
know in isolation from those subjectivities with 
whom I stay in co-existence.  I can only know my 
world as an “our-world” and as a world which has 
meaning for me through others.  And so, the world 
can only have meaning through world-relatedness of 
‘I’ and ‘You’, which emerges as a dialogue of self 
and other, and is disclosed as an existential 
imperative. 
This notion of companionship, as articulated by 
Luijpen, bares an interpretive resemblance to Buber’s 
(1970) notion of the I-Thou relationship.  In Buber’s 
system, ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ are posited as an 
intersubjective co-creation in which both are brought 
into a realisation of self and other through a reciprocal 
recognition of the other.  In terms of companionship 
as an existential theme within the phenomenology of 
intersubjectivity, it can be seen how my meeting with 
the other, and the relationship of acceptance and 
likeness which characterises that meeting, amounts to 
a co-creation of the world as a lived-world and as a 
shared world.  My commonness emerges through 
intersubjective experience as an appropriation of the 
world of my lived-experience.  It is through the other 
that I am brought into perception of that world as it is 
for me.  And it is here that we are brought back to 
Luijpen’s original statement that my being-in-the-
world is a being-through-others (Luijpen, 1969).  It is 
through my being as a subject in relation to the world 
which I interpret, and that world’s interrelation to me, 
that I am brought into being through others in the 
world - as a being-in-the-world-amongst-others. 
Intersubjectivity and the likeness of being 
The experience of individuals within their lived-world 
of social occupation constitutes an important 
consideration in the exploration of being-in-the-
world.  “To exist”, suggests Luijpen (1969, p.  261) 
“is to co-exist”.  In terms of the phenomenological 
unfolding of this co-existence, self and world are 
established through an interpermeation; a flowing of 
the one into the other, such that both are met in an 
experiential revelation that is being-with-others 
(Adams, 1999). 
This potential for permeation of individuals within 
their world, suggests Natanson (1974), arises out of a 
functional reciprocation in which they are able to 
experience themselves within the social collective.  I, 
through my presence, typify the others experience of 
self, and others, through their recognition of me and 
their concurrent typification of my attributes, allows 
me to apprehend my own likeness.  Kruger (1988) 
echoes this hypothesis in his exploration of 
Heidegger’s notion of the Mitsein.  Kruger examines 
the notion of our co-habitation within a common 
world in terms of our being-with-one-another. 
Our world is a world which we share with others of 
whom we have an originary knowledge of being in 
the world in the same way as we are.  Being human 
means being in relation to others (Kruger, 1988, p.  
81). 
Adams (1999) recapitulates this sentiment in his 
examination of what he calls an ‘agency-in-
communion’.  In this sense, the self is grasped as an 
active individuality, a self-initiating autonomy 
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functioning within a collective and situated as one 
within social existence.  Although there is no 
intention here to hint at a transpersonal psychological 
conception of the-individual-in-the-world, the 
description of social occupation and co-existence as a 
form of communion is useful insofar as it implies a 
metaphoric sameness which unfolds as the foundation 
of individual purpose and intentionality. 
Ambiguity, isolation, and knowledge of other 
minds  
Thus far we have posited the notion of 
intersubjectivity in terms of the emergence of self 
through a reciprocal co-recognition of self and other.  
Intersubjectivity, as an interconnectedness between 
self and world, unfolds as an illumination of self 
through the perceiving of the self in the other and in 
the world.  It is thus that the self is brought into being 
through the other.  It is now time to put a theoretical 
spanner in the works.   
Scheff (1973) expressed his understanding of the 
disclosure of ambiguity within the intersubjective 
space.  This ambiguity arises through the problem of 
knowledge of other minds.  The actions of the other 
are the route through which I gain knowledge of the 
other but only as they are for me.  In this sense, I 
cannot know the other fully.  I cannot know their 
mind as they know it but only as I take it in my 
framing of it.  And it is of course the same for the 
other in their estimation of me.  This inability to know 
other minds unfolds within the lived-world as the 
cause of the misunderstanding and ambivalence 
which shapes interpersonal existence (Scheff, 1973).  
My knowledge of the other is just that, my 
knowledge.  And it is by virtue of this disconnection 
of awareness that I find myself isolated and 
misunderstood in relation to the other.  
In his recounting of the ambivalence which defines 
this interpersonal situating of self and other, Scheff 
has captured quite concretely the disconnection which 
defines the location of one subjectivity in relation to 
another.  That which I know of the other is only true 
within the limits of my own understandings which are 
confined to knowledge of things not of minds.  And 
so, in knowing others I always and inevitably miss 
them.  
In the discussion of the results of the research 
findings which follow, it shall be seen how this 
comparison of Buber’s notion of the I-Thou 
relationship and Sartre’s schematic construction of 
being-for-others emerges as significant as a 
framework for understanding interpersonal 
relationships.  These opposing systems of 
understanding shall be employed as a way of 
exploring such relationships as these relationships are 
experienced by individuals branded as manifesting a 
specific mental illness.   
In light of this exploration of the phenomenology of 
intersubjectivity we now explore the notion of 
alienation and loneliness as understood within an 
existential phenomenological framework.  
Existentialism, suggests Burston (1998) asserts that 
despite different social, historical, cultural and 
interpersonal situations, and differences in age, 
gender and race, humans, simply by virtue of their 
existence, partake in the same basic structure of 
existence and of being-in-the-world.  Alienation, as a 
“state or process whereby one becomes separated or 
estranged from one’s original condition”, unfolds as 
something inconsistent with the notion of the 
evenness of being (Burston, 1998, p.  84).  Alienation 
is explored here in relation to the experience of 
loneliness and separateness from the world and from 
others in the world (Olds & Schwartz, 2000). 
Loneliness is here defined as the result of an inability 
on the part of the self to communicate to the other.  
The lonely self is understood here as one which feels 
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that its way of being is seen by the other as 
inadmissible, abnormal or defective (Sadler, 1978).  
Lonely individuals are understood as those who are 
unable to make themselves known to others.  They 
are unable to convey that which constitutes their own 
truth as that truth is lived by them.  They are 
‘outsiders’.  In terms of loneliness as understood 
within the field of mental health, it is seen to be 
attached directly to the construction of notions of 
normality and abnormality in terms of the individual’s 
presentation of self within world.  The mentally ill 
individual, the labelled individual, is present in the 
world amongst others as one whose actions are 
deviant, abnormal, and defective.  Whether this 
emergence of the labelled individual as being 
different impacts upon the experience of isolation or 
separateness from the world will be explored later on. 
Science and the construction of the diagnostic 
object 
The DSM-IV is formulated as an evidence-based 
nosology, grounded in observations of perceptible 
behaviours, signs and symptoms (Frances & Egger, 
1999).  It manifests as an attempt to glean a global 
description of the individual’s complaint which is 
descriptive of all spheres within which that complaint 
is disclosed, and is based in what can be objectively 
known of that complaint.  Goodwin and Guze (1996) 
suggest that diagnostic classification operates to allow 
for communication of disorders across social, cultural 
and geographical boundaries, and facilitates 
prediction of the course of a particular psychiatric 
syndrome.  Diagnosis is prognosis.  The system of 
psychiatric diagnosis manifests an attempt to define 
clinical entities and to outline the expected course of 
mentally ill individuals’ symptomatic presentation 
(Maxmen, 1980).  The disorders articulated in the 
DSM manuals are understood as natural categories 
and are thus considered to be rule-bound in their 
manifestation.  The category is approached as a class 
of entities or operations that are objectively real in the 
world.  In this sense, the psychiatric diagnosis 
emerges as a solid and objectively real system 
describing a specific pattern of scientifically 
knowable symptoms. 
Thus we see the emergence of the medical model of 
psychiatric intervention.  The medicalisation of 
psychiatry has been established as a system in which 
psychiatric disorders are constructed as describable 
immutable entities which are biological deviations 
(Keisler, 2000;  Szasz, 2000).  Psychiatry has 
therefore been translated into a treatment based in the 
application of modern biology and psychiatric 
disorders, and has thus come to be evaluated from 
within this mode of inspection.  It is through this 
understanding of mental illness as related to a 
physiological aetiology that the psychiatrist, operating 
as scientist of the ‘diseased soul’ (Van den Berg, 
1972), is enabled to categorically state a diagnosis.  
The psychiatric diagnosis, when approached as an 
intervention in direct relation to human 
consciousness, appears to emerge as problematic in 
terms of its tendency towards reductionism and the 
reification of subjectivity (Ross & Pam, 1995).  
Psychiatry, as it has emerged in contemporary 
medicine, bypasses the subjectivity which it attempts 
to treat.  In its function as a biological science, 
psychiatry circumvents those fundamentally human 
elements of existence which shape our being-in-the-
world as social beings (Bradfield, 2002, 2003).  This 
work aims to explore the disclosure of the diagnosis 
in the lived-world of the individual, and it is towards 
such an evaluation of the diagnosis that this article’s 
direction turns.   
As has been stated, mental disorders are understood 
from within the scientific paradigm as  discernible 
entities born out of a physiological deviation in the 
individual (Kiesler, 2000).  Bradfield (2002, 2003) 
articulates the notion that this positing of mental 
Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 3, Edition 1, November 2003  Page 6 of 20 
 
The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) can be found at www.ipjp.org.  
The IPJP is a joint project of Rhodes University in South Africa and Edith Cowan University in Australia. This 
document is subject to copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any medium (print, electronic 
or otherwise) without the express permission of the publishers. 
6
illness as physiological in its causation amounts to the 
construction of the mental illness as a thing, separate 
and measurable.  The psychogenesis of mental illness 
is therefore conceptualised as a biogenesis; the illness 
is perceived as occupying a physical space.  Medard 
Boss (1979) explored the implications of the scientific 
attitude in relation to mental illness as being causally 
linked with biological deviation.  Boss’s 
phenomenological psychology pronounces a critique 
of the psychiatric endeavour as being an incomplete 
attempt at capturing human consciousness.  Boss 
bases his critique on his exploration of the natural 
scientific attitude, a perspective which, he maintains, 
is disconnected from the mode of human existence. 
Scientific methodology is reliant upon the notion of 
spatiality.  The scientific objective can be seen as one 
which must secure the concept of spatiality so as to 
find a basis for its measurements and deductions: the 
scientific object is rendered calculable insofar as it 
can be found in a world of discrete physical 
manifestations, and its location, as a distinct entity, 
can be judged in terms of its spatial relation to other 
entities.  It is towards an evaluation of this reduction, 
as it impacts upon the humanness of the psychiatric 
endeavour, that Boss’s critique is aimed.   
The reduction of space, suggests Boss (1979), is 
achieved through emptying regions of space and 
through constructing space as a void.  As seen 
through the scientific gaze, space is that unblemished 
gap which lies between two points and allows for a 
calculation of those two points in relation to one 
another.  This notion of the depletion of regions of 
space, says Boss (1979) has been transferred onto the 
psychological sciences.  Insofar as the aim of this 
article is to explore the subjective impact of the 
diagnosis on the diagnosed individual, this 
transference must be evaluated in terms whether it 
impacts upon the individual’s experience.  How can it 
be said that such spatiality as defines the evaluation of 
inanimate objects can be applied to the appraisal of 
peoples being-in-the-world?  As an intentional 
consciousness, how can humanity be considered 
calculable in terms of spatiality?     
Karlsson (1992, p. 405) extends Boss’s argument, 
exploring the spatiality of the “psychological unit”.  
The psychological unit is seen within psychological 
science through the lens of what he terms eliminative 
materialism.  This theoretical initiative amounts to the 
reduction of psychology to the science of neurology 
and to the sedimentation of psychological 
phenomena.  In terms of the manifestation of this 
reduction within scientific psychological practice, we 
see the diminishment of subjective experience to a 
physiological description (Karlsson, 1992).  This 
diminishment of subjective meaning within scientific 
psychological practice finds its origin in mainstream 
psychology’s subscription to the premises of the 
natural-scientific framework.  And is it this notion of 
spatiality that has converted the psychiatric sciences 
from the study of the human being into the scientific 
evaluation of a person as an embodied thing, 
determined by a neurophysiological causal process 
(Bradfield, 2002).  “Man-as-object becomes the focus 
of study, and not man as a person.” (Giorgi, 1970, p.  
113). 
Method 
Phenomenological enquiry amounts to a focus on the 
way in which experience is given directly through the 
participants expression, prior to the interpretation of 
those expressions.  In this sense, the 
phenomenological question is focused upon eliciting 
the life-world.  Within phenomenological research the 
lebenswelt is awarded explorative primacy and it is 
towards an uncovering and understanding of meaning, 
as revealed within the lebenswelt, that 
phenomenology directs its inquiry (Giorgi, 1975).  As 
indicated in the introduction, the principle question 
asked is:  “What is the experience of being a labelled 
individual in the world?”.  There were  other related 
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questions such as  “What does the label mean for the 
person labelled, and how does the labelled individual 
understand that meaning, and respond to that meaning 
in his or her lived- world?”  Most importantly within 
the context of the research on which this article is 
based, how does the labelled individual’s 
understanding of the label impact upon his or her 
experience of self in relation to others?  What is 
presented below are the results of the findings only 
which form the discussion.  This means that although 
no protocols are included, such protocols are 
available on request. 
Data was collected using semi-structured interviews 
(Kvale, 1996).  Participants were simply asked to tell 
their own story in their own words.  Interviews lasted 
an average of fifty minutes, and were tape recorded 
and transcribed verbatim.  
Grounded theory, as formulated within the qualitative 
research tradition, was chosen as the method most 
suited to the purposes of this study.  Through a series 
of steps or stages, grounded theory aims to render 
intelligible the experiences of an individual subject 
from within the situation of that subject’s experiential 
world (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  Briefly, these steps 
involve a sequential process of ‘unpacking’ in which 
the text is subdivided into smaller units of analysis 
known as codes.  Such codes are explored for the 
relationships existing between them.  This 
comparison of codes, known as ‘constant 
comparison’, pervades the analytic process (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998).  Constant comparison manifests in 
three different coding procedures: ‘open coding’, 
‘axial coding’ and ‘selective coding’ (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998) all of which aim to progressively bring 
meaning to the data.  The next stage, that of 
association, involves the construction of models of 
understanding and is done with reference to the 
context within which the text is located (Terre 
Blanche & Kelly, 1999).  At this point in the 
investigative process, a system of core codes emerge, 
a lucid presentation of the relationships and 
interactions between those codes, and a system of 
theoretical propositions in explication of these 
interconnections.  It is through this conceptual 
creation of codes and their interrelations that 
integrative diagramming, which is the schematic 
representation of codes and sub-codes, is made 
possible.  The final analytic motion in grounded 
theory is that of translating the schematic into the 
narrative, converting diagram into story (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998).  This narrative account unfolds as the 
transfiguration of conceptual abstractions thereby 
returning to the subjective telling of the participant’s 
situation.  The narrative emerges as a description of 
the tensions existing in relation to the codes and sub-
codes, and expresses these tensions as they are 
present within the lived-world of the participant.  It is 
through such a narrative account that the theory is 
validated and the data grounded. 
Three English-speaking adult participants (two 
women and one man) were selected based on the 
following criteria: Participants had been informed of 
their having a specific psychiatric diagnosis and that 
they had been diagnosed at least one year prior to the 
time of the interview as it was considered relevant 
insofar as this research aimed at an elicitation of the 
lived-experience of the diagnosis.  At the time of the 
interviews they were not in a mental institution and 
had not been in one in the previous 12 months.  It is 
towards a phenomenological dissection of the 
diagnostic label only and not the effect of 
institutionalisation, that this work is aimed.  It was 
decided that participants must have been informed of 
their diagnosis by a psychiatrist.  This requirement 
was considered important insofar as the function of 
psychiatry as a biomedical endeavour is a significant 
consideration within this study.  Being diagnosed by a 
psychiatrist would therefore be more appropriate in 
terms of the focus of the study.  The culture or sex of 
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participants was not considered important in terms of 
the results of the study.  As long as the individual was 
diagnosed according to the Western system of 
psychiatric classification the individual’s cultural 
background did not factor in.   
The first participant was a woman in her early 
twenties and working as a musician.  She had been 
diagnosed with generalized anxiety disorder, social 
phobia, bipolar phase 1, as well as borderline 
personality disorder.  She  stated that borderline 
personality disorder and bipolar mood disorder “were 
the ones that stuck”.  The second (married) woman 
participant was in her late twenties and unemployed.  
She had been diagnosed with bipolar mood disorder.  
The third participant was a man in his early thirties 
and a student at university.  He was initially 
diagnosed with schizophrenia. This diagnosis was 
changed thereafter to bipolar mood disorder. 
Discussion 
This section investigates the elicitation of the 
participants lived-world by relating what has been 
presented to an understanding of being-in-the-world, 
being-diagnosed, and being-with-others in the world. 
As a reminder, what is presented below are the results 
of the findings only which form the discussion. 
The label embodied  
One of the most notable reactions, in terms of the 
present consideration of psychiatry as a bio-science, 
was the idea that the diagnosis turns the diagnosed 
individual into basically just an organism.  Insofar as 
the diagnosis is given as a biological description of a 
psychological state, this offering is felt by the 
individual as a translation of that state from 
something mental, emotional and subjective, into 
something physiological. It becomes a “sickness”.  
And insofar as this sickness is understood as 
neurophysiologically based, it renders the individual 
who has such a sickness “chemically controlled” by 
that sickness.  The notion that one’s emotional state 
and one’s subjectivity could be described as being 
constituted by an abnormality in one’s chemical 
constitution was felt as an “insult” which “robbed” 
the individuals of their emotional reactions of 
sincerity and validity.  One participant said: 
“What you’re feeling, is it sincere or not?  Because an 
emotion as opposed to a chemical is quite a different 
thing.  When feelings becomes labels it becomes 
blurred and dangerous.” 
This expression reveals an obvious tension in relation 
to the nature of psychiatric description.  The disorder 
becomes a ‘disability’ which is grasped as a ‘physical 
disability’ by both the psychiatrist and the diagnosed 
individual. 
The exploration, as presented earlier, of Medard 
Boss’ formulation of spatiality as a function of 
science and psychiatry, also emerged as central to the 
understanding of the participants’ revelations.  Such 
individuals appear to experience a sense of the label 
as being present physically within them, as being a 
physical disability.  The label begins to be understood 
in this way as a space-occupying disease entity.  Most 
importantly, in terms of the notion of the spatiality of 
the disease entity, is the subjective experience of 
being ‘displaced’ by the label which now comes to 
inhabit that space.  One participant remarked: 
“…  I’m not a person, but a chemically controlled one 
of many ….  Where is the space for one violinist?  
The artist; The sensuous creature?   There is none – 
can’t you see? The space is taken up?”  
This labelled individual (one of the women) appears 
to feel that part of her self is replaced by the diagnosis 
which functions as a new and more solidified 
description of her self.  The space is taken up by a 
label which becomes internalised within the 
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individual, and which is understood as a description 
of who or what that individual is. 
Intentional consciousness and the label 
The understanding of consciousness – as expressed 
above - is central to the consideration of the impact of 
the diagnosis on the individual.  The diagnosis 
emerges as a description of a mental, emotional and 
behavioural state which is offered simultaneously as a 
description of a physiological abnormality.  As a 
description of a mental state, the diagnosis emerges 
also as a description of consciousness.  It is posited 
herein that the diagnosis, as a description of an 
individual, emerges as a framework from within 
which that consciousness can be explicated, evaluated 
and understood (Bradfield, 2002).  One participant 
commented: 
“To look in a book and see, ‘These are eight or ten 
things which your general borderline personality will 
have.’ And oh, tick, tick, tick, tick, tick … There I am 
on that page.”  
Insofar as the consciousness of the labelled individual 
is revealed as a consciousness described and judged, 
that consciousness emerges as something which is not 
clear.  The consciousness of the labelled individual is 
disclosed in the world precisely as ‘the consciousness 
of the labelled individual’.  This means that the  
consistency that is consciousness is somehow 
‘channelled’ or controlled. 
Participants revealed the experience of a sense of 
permanence and constancy in relation to the 
emergence of the diagnosis.  This apprehension of 
permanence was related to a subjective reaction to the 
diagnosis in which it was felt that the diagnosis 
occupied a definite ‘space’ in relation to the 
individual and that individual’s consciousness.  There 
is a sense that a certain part of the self is displaced by 
the label as it becomes concretised within the 
individual’s consciousness.    One participant 
explained: 
“Everything became a part of my condition.   I no 
longer had feelings, but moods and condition; and I 
was related to in that way.  And then I become a 
condition. …  It sort of takes you out of yourself as a 
human being into sort of like an organism.” 
Insofar as the diagnosis was seen to emerge within 
consciousness as a real and tangible occupant of 
consciousness, it seems that the individual who ‘lives 
the diagnosis’ is ‘channelled’ by the delineation that 
is the diagnosis.  In this sense, the individual lives as a 
bipolar or as a borderline.  This statement echoes the 
experience, as obtained from the data, of having a part 
of oneself displaced by the label.  The diagnosis 
becomes “stuck” to the individual whose 
consciousness it describes.  The diagnosis, for the 
diagnosed individual, becomes “permanent”, “just 
like diabetes”, “a sickness”, “a mental illness full 
stop”, and something that you must “live with until 
you die”.  But how can consciousness, as that which 
the diagnosis describes, be understood as such?  Can 
consciousness be delineated by diagnostic science?  If 
so, how does this delineation impact on the 
experience of the diagnosed individual?  
On the finding of self in world: An exploration of 
being-with-others 
The label is experienced as something internal to the 
individual and as something which the individual 
comes to “embody”.  Understood as such, the label is 
given as the situation from within which such 
individuals experience their world and as an 
intentional being in that world.  One participant 
revealed: 
“You want to know what you embody, and what you 
embody is a disorder …  so then, now I’m a bipolar.  
Having internalised them (the labels), indulged them, 
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played with them, I am not sure I can rid myself of 
these labels.  Although I do not really believe in 
labelling, I live it every day.  It’s like learning to live 
again.  But this time, with a disorder.” 
In terms of the labeled individual’s existence-in-
relation-to-others, the position of the labelled self in 
relation to the unlabelled other is one defined by a 
sense of wrongness, abnormality, defectiveness and 
difference.   In that place where individuals find 
themselves with and amongst others, in that meeting 
of self and other, labelled individuals seem to 
experience a strong sense of their unlikeness and 
dissimilarity as a result of being labelled.  One 
participant announced: 
“It’s like there’s something wrong.  And what’s 
wrong?  I’m wrong.  It’s that sort of feeling ... I feel 
like a bit of an odd-ball.” 
It can therefore be seen that the lebenswelt of the 
labelled individual is one defined by being present to 
others in terms of being ‘unlike’ the other.  The 
experience of “being-wrong” as it relates to difference 
and dissimilarity is explored in this work through the 
framework of two interpretive foci.  Firstly, we shall 
appraise the participants experience of difference and 
unlikeness in terms of the notion of typification, as 
formulated by Natanson (1974) and the notion of the 
complementary identity, as formulated by Sartre 
(1943)  and represented earlier.    
These labelled participants, in experiencing 
themselves as “different”,  “abnormal”, and “wrong” 
in their “disordered” self appears to have no 
experience of being typified in their being-with-
others.  There is no sense in which such individuals 
find their likeness in the other.  Labelled individuals 
are present to others in the world as one who is not-
like those around them.  In this sense, there appears to 
be a subjective experience of meeting the other as one 
who is “not-like-me”.  Luijpen (1969) explored the 
notion of intersubjectivity in terms of the 
apprehension of likeness in self and other and it is 
precisely this apprehension which does not seem to 
emerge in the labelled individual.  One participant 
disclosed: 
“It makes me feel a bit funny sometimes.  Like I feel 
separate from the world.  Like I feel different.” 
How can this awareness of difference from the other 
be understood?  In answering this question we would 
like to return the reader to the exploration of 
intersubjectivity.  According to the theoretically 
diverse and yet similar propositions of such thinkers 
as Buber (1970), Kruger (1988), Luijpen (1969) and 
Schulte (2000), the experience of intersubjectivity is 
grounded to a large extent in the mutual revelation of 
self to other and other to self, such that both are 
disclosed through that meeting.  This reciprocal 
illumination of both self and other, suggests Schulte 
(2000), emerges as a mutual gaze in which subject 
and world are present to each other as an image or 
indication of what the other is for her or himself.   
Von Eckartsberg (1989) explored the intersubjective 
relationship in terms of the value which this 
recognition of likeness and commonness holds for 
such a relationship.  Von Eckartsberg emphasized the 
importance of being present to an other within a 
common subjective space; realizing the interpersonal 
similarities which define that space, and the 
correspondence and mutuality which characterizes 
and enriches that space.  This communion, as it has 
been suggested, emerges through the apprehension of 
likeness in the other; and it is precisely this 
recognition of likeness which is the birthplace of 
value and meaning in interpersonal.  
Through the evaluation of the data collected, the 
participants experienced a sense of being-in-the-world 
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as one who is fundamentally different from others in 
that world.  One participant confessed: 
“I feel different.   Like a bit of an odd-ball maybe.  
I’ve got limitations that are different from other 
peoples.” 
As mentioned above, intersubjectivity is defined as 
the relation of a subjectivity to the world in which 
that subjectivity exists; and is the interconnectedness 
of self and world in which being-in-the-world 
establishes itself in relation to the world and to other 
selves (Schulte, 2000).  Fundamental to this notion of 
the betweenness of human existence in which self and 
world are established in that space which connects 
them, is the idea that meaning is found and created in 
that meeting place (Luijpen, 1969;  Schulte, 2000).  In 
light of this, what is the situation of the labelled 
individual in terms of his or her existence as a being-
with others?  It is precisely the situation described 
above, that of the experience of dissimilarity, 
unlikeness and separateness, which appears to define 
this situation. 
One participant acknowledged: 
“I mean what is a disorder.  It’s something that’s 
wrong.  Something that’s not right.”  
This experience of difference emerged in relation to 
being diagnosed with a psychiatric illness.  Another  
participant admitted: 
“Being bipolar, having a diagnosis, having a 
psychiatric illness, having a disability.  It makes you 
different from other so-called normal people.”  
The participants experienced a commonality in the 
degree of anxiety at the possibility of being rejected 
by others.  For the two of the participants their 
response to this was to give others a full explanation 
of the nature of their illness so as to “explain” why 
they are “different”.  This tendency to explain the 
illness emerged as a presentation of the self through 
the diagnostic description such that the self came to 
be understood through the terms of the diagnosis.  
The participants seemed to want others who are not 
diagnosed as mentally ill to accept them as they are 
“with this difference.”  One participant responded: 
“Sometimes I’m trying to make friends and then I 
might bring it up because I want to be accepted for 
who I am with this difference.  But other people may 
say ‘Oh, that’s weird.  You’re a weirdo.’  I feel the 
need to explain to people because it helps them to 
understand me better.” 
It is here that we find a connection with the 
interpersonal theories of Sartre and Buber.  It is 
suggested in this work that the experiences of the 
participants, in terms of their existence in relation to 
others who are not labelled, is effected by the 
difference constructed through the positioning of 
labelled individuals in relation to those who are not-
labelled.  Labelled individuals experience their label 
as a signification of something permanent, immutable 
and concrete.  And so it is that participants came to 
“embody” that which is experienced as “different”, 
“wrong”, and “abnormal”.  More importantly is the 
notion that the individual is present to the other as a 
labelled-individual-in-relation-to-a-non-labelled-
individual.      
Participants felt a compulsion to present themselves 
to the other through the delineations of their own 
label.  This need arose as a result of a total acceptance 
of the label and of what the label represents as a 
clinical entity.  The participants accepted the ‘truth’ 
which the label held as a description of themselves 
and presented themselves to others as a living 
embodiment of that description.  They refused to 
allow that they could be understood entirely in terms 
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of the label and felt “insulted” at the notion that the 
label was understood as a full description of a 
definable clinical disease entity.  This disease entity 
could be understood as a complete account of the 
individual’s neurophysiological state and of the 
individual’s resultant behavioural deviations.  And 
this systematized perception of the individual’s being-
in-the-world was defined by an understanding of the 
permanence and singularity that was his or her 
diagnosis. 
It is proposed here that this presentation of the 
labelled individual to others who are not labelled 
unfolds within the interpersonal realm as an 
objectivisation of the labelled individual as a being-
in-the-world.  The individual comes to inhabit the 
label.  Such individuals come to exist in relation to 
the other as being-labelled.  As it appeared through 
the data, this inhabitation of the label arises as a result 
of two things.  Either the expectation on the part of 
the other that labelled individuals will behave in 
direct accordance with the prescriptions of the label, 
or as a result of labelled individuals presenting 
themselves to the other as being-labelled.  In both 
instances the labelled participants appeared to operate 
within the context of interpersonal relationships as the 
one who is labelled, and who behaves in certain 
concretely defined ways, as defined by the label.   
Elemental to this idea of the objectivisation of the 
labelled individual is the notion of observation and 
the presence of an external gaze.  All labelled 
participants experienced a sense of being interpreted 
or read by others in terms of the other’s expectation 
of what and how labelled individuals behaviour 
should be.  This experience emerged as an awareness 
on the part of the labelled individuals of an external 
gaze which was focused upon them.  One participant 
retorted: 
“Only when I’m by myself can I just sort of ‘be’.  
They (other people) think if you’ve got a problem like 
that you must be wacky or in an institution of 
something.”  
It can thus be seen how the individual labelled with a 
specific diagnosis comes to be seen as an objectifiable 
presence in relation to others.  The individual 
becomes, for the other, a living embodiment of a 
“condition” or a “disability” or “symptom”.  The 
diagnosis comes to define how the diagnosed 
individual is understood by others with whom that 
individual interacts.  In this sense, the individual 
comes to be understood through his or her diagnosis 
in “concrete”,  “permanent” and “object-like” terms.  
This way of perceiving labelled individuals also 
manifested as an internal gaze in which labelled 
individuals were seen to be very watchful of 
themselves, essentially monitoring the course of 
symptoms which belong to the diagnosis.  One 
participant mentioned: 
“I have been taught to be aware of every shifting 
mood and change.  Anticipation and judgement of 
mood and behaviour is not natural and is not allowing 
one to live freely; but externally, always out of 
oneself, like an observer.”  
Buber’s (1970) notion of the I-Thou relationship is 
defined by a confirmation of a mutual and reciprocal 
acceptance of the likeness and dissimilarity of the 
other in relation to the self.  As mentioned earlier, 
Buber does not suggest that all interhuman 
relatedness is characterized by this ideal.  He 
maintains that the objectification of the self, of which 
Sartre(1943) speaks, can be overcome through the 
meeting of self and other in a dialogical relationship 
defined by acceptance, confirmation of unlikeness, 
and validation of difference.  This interhuman space 
is understood in stark opposition to Sartre’s 
formulation of being-for-others.  It is  suggested here 
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that these two systems can be understood as operating 
in terms of a dialectic in which both come to be 
defined by a relative degree of knowledge of other 
minds.  It is suggested that the interpersonal realm, 
the realm of being-with-others, is affected by the 
degree to which both self and other are able to enter 
into one another, to interpenetrate, and therefore gain 
an more complete understanding of the other and of 
the self.  In relationships defined by acceptance, 
confirmation and justification of similarity and 
unlikeness, it appears that both self and other are able 
to realize this mutual understanding (Von 
Eckartsberg, 1989).   
In light of this, how can the relationship of the 
labelled individual to the other be understood?  It 
appears that these labelled individuals, in 
experiencing themselves in relation to the other as 
being “different”, “weird”, “abnormal”, and “wrong” 
did not experience any degree of confirmation and 
validation by the other.  They feel “stuck” in their 
wrongness and their difference and feel that they are 
defined by their  labels in terms of others 
interpretations of them as labelled individuals.  These 
labelled individuals appear repulsed by this 
experience of being stuck to their label, and being 
stuck to others interpretations of them as being-
labelled.  These labelled individuals therefore appear 
to exist amongst others as a being-for-others who are 
stuck in their be-ing through the others interpretations 
of them as labelled (Karlsson, 1992).  The label is 
experienced by the participants as being permanent, 
concrete and immutable, and it appears that this sense 
of permanence and object-ness finds its way into 
these labelled individuals’ world through their 
interactions and relationships with others. 
Labelling and the phenomenology of being-lonely 
One element of the labelled individual’s experience of 
being-in-the-world and being-with others as one who 
is labelled which has not yet been explored is the 
experience of isolation and separateness.  Participants 
expressed a sense of loneliness in relation to their 
experience of being labelled. 
“I generally don’t see myself as part of any whole 
thing, like any sort of community or whatever I’m 
supposed to be part of.”  
“I feel lonely … I feel isolated.  They don’t have the 
sickness.”  
 “I feel a sense of isolation from the world.  Having a 
disability I feel a bit on the sidelines.  I feel a bit 
different from other people.”  
The experience of isolation and loneliness is a 
problem most often encountered by health 
professionals but is one to which insufficient attention 
has been devoted.  The sense of alienation and 
separation which emerged through the data was 
disclosed both as an alienation from self and an 
alienation from the other.  Burston (1998) suggests 
that these two kinds of alienation are tightly bound to 
one another.  As was stated earlier, loneliness is the 
subjective result of an inability on the part of the self 
to convey itself to the other.  The lonely self, in this 
sense, is fundamentally misunderstood (Sadler, 1978).  
This experience of being misinterpreted, of being 
perceived as a diagnosed individual and therefore 
incompletely understood, emerged through the data.  
One participant reported: 
“People may not understand or accept me.  It’s 
something that other people don’t have.”  
The sense on the part of these labelled individuals 
was that “people don’t really know anything about 
these labels”, as one of the participant’s put it, 
contributes to the experience of being alone with 
one’s condition.  Of course, this experience of 
loneliness seems to come to the fore with individuals 
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who live beyond the institution and with others who 
are not labelled.  It was seen that the close 
juxtaposition of the labelled individual with others 
who are not labelled interferes with the labelled 
individual’s capacity to relate to others on a simple 
social level.  One participant recounted: 
“I feel isolated because I never actually talk to people 
that has got that.  They don’t have the sickness.  I feel 
isolated because I feel they don’t understand.”   
And so it seems that there is an evident connection 
between these three labelled individuals perception of 
their being misunderstood by the unlabelled 
individual, and the labelled individuals experience of 
loneliness, isolation, and disconnection.  This 
experience of loneliness can be understood in terms 
of the exploration of the phenomenology of 
loneliness, as presented earlier in this article.  Sadler 
(1978) relates the experience of loneliness to the 
inability to convey oneself as one is to the other.  
Individuals, in this sense, find that they are 
fundamentally misunderstood and misinterpreted.  
This conception of loneliness implies a construction 
of normality and abnormality in terms of an 
individual’s presentation of self to other.  In this 
sense, these labelled individuals experience that 
which they are as being fundamentally abnormal, 
wrong, and inadmissible.  The result of this is a 
profound sense of loneliness, separation and 
disconnection.  In their difference, they feel that they 
are isolated through their inability to convey to the 
other that which constitutes themselves.   They cannot 
be understood, penetrated, fathomed.  They are 
labelled, and in the stuckness and concretisation 
which that label implies, they remain mis-perceived 
and incompletely known.  They are  estranged.  In 
their relations to others they appears to be alone, 
detached, and isolated.  In their being-different they 
find that they are stuck.  They are stuck to their label; 
to their wrongness; to their disconnection.  
 The notion of being isolated through the inability to 
know other minds was documented earlier.  It was 
suggested that although we may know the other 
through our interpretations of their actions we can 
never really know them (Scheff, 1973).  This inability 
to know other minds emerges within our experience 
as the origin of misunderstanding and ambivalence in 
our interpersonal relationships.  Knowledge of the 
other, and therefore an increased association and 
connectedness with the other, arises through close 
interpersonal relationships, as defined here through 
the structure of the Buberian I-Thou presencing.  Now 
if we consider this position in relation to the 
experiences of the labelled individual, it appears that 
the sense of alienation, isolation and disconnection is 
worsened through being labelled.  The label, as has 
been seen, is something which can only be truly 
known from within the lived-experience of the 
labelled individual.  One participant related:  
“People don’t really know anything about these labels 
anyway ....  It feels as if our friends got fewer and 
fewer because they don’t know anything about the 
sickness ....  I feel the need to explain to people 
because it helps them understand me better.”  
This labelled individual appears to be fundamentally 
unknown, misunderstood, and mysterious.  And it is 
as a result of this that the labelled individual’s 
experience of disconnection from the world, and from 
the other, is consolidated. 
It is suggested that the loneliness and disconnection 
from the other can be understood as emerging in 
connection with the position of asymmetrical 
relatedness (Fromm, 1991) which defines the 
relationship between the labelled individual and the 
one not-labelled.  This pattern of relatedness between 
self and other, suggests Fromm, puts the one whose 
subjectivity is denied in a position of separateness, 
depletion and isolation.  As can be seen through the 
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data, this isolation and separateness defines the 
relationship between the labelled individual and the 
other.  The labelled individual is grasped as a 
“condition”, a “disorder”, and is thus incorrectly and 
incompletely grasped.  He or she is misunderstood, 
and detached from others through their 
misunderstanding.  In terms of the exploration of the 
impact of the diagnosis on the individual’s experience 
of being-with-others it appears we have a problem. 
The participants experienced themselves as being 
misunderstood by others and insofar as they are 
understood only in terms of their label.  This resulted 
in a strong sense of loneliness, detachment, isolation 
and disconnection.  The relationship of the labelled 
individuals to others who are not labelled therefore 
emerged as an asymmetrical relationship in which the 
labelled individuals full subjectivity are disallowed, 
and they are understood only in terms of their label.  
They are therefore misunderstood and lonely.  
Removed.  Enclosed within their diagnosis.  They are 
the outsiders. 
Conclusion 
The fact that no significant amount of research into 
the subjective impact of the psychiatric label beyond 
the mental institution has been conducted was a 
significant reason for choosing such a research 
endeavour as this one.   
Several analytic codes emerged in terms of the 
participants experience of their diagnosis.  Among 
these were the following: 
1) The experience of being wrong, different and 
abnormal was seen as central to the experience of 
being labelled as mentally ill.  This experience of 
being “unlike” other unlabelled individuals was the 
core code with which all other codes interacted; 
 
2) The diagnosis was experienced by the labelled 
individual as something permanent and fixed 
within the lived-world of the individual.  The 
label, as an immutable fixture within the 
participants lives, therefore appeared to “take up 
space” in a literal sense within the their daily life.  
As a permanent ‘thing’, and as something which 
in its manifestation is unchanging, the label 
therefore appeared to exist in relation to the 
individual as a concrete presence in the life of 
that individual.  In terms of the impact of the 
label on the participants within their daily 
interpersonal functioning, it appeared that the 
participants, to a certain degree, felt the need to 
present themselves in terms of their diagnoses so 
that they could be “understood” by others.  The 
one woman participant did this by adopting the 
role of the bipolar or the borderline.  She “played 
the part”.  The other two participants felt the need 
to explain themselves to others in terms of their 
labels so that others would not be put off by the 
fact that they are mentally ill.  They did this so as 
to avoid rejection on the part of the other.  It is 
thus that the participants presented themselves to 
others as “labelled individuals”; 
3) The experience of being-labelled was also 
characterised by an internal and an external  
monitoring of the individual as someone 
manifesting a specific diagnosis.  In this sense 
the individual monitors his or her behaviour from 
within the parameters of the specific diagnosis.  
The individual evaluates, judges and inspects his 
or her behaviour.   The same woman participant 
spoke of being her own “objective observer”.  
This internal monitoring emerged as something 
particularly unpleasant and unnecessary for her.  
The participants also expressed the notion that 
their behaviour is watched by others; constantly 
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monitored in terms of the others’ expectations of 
how they should behave as labelled individuals; 
4) The experience of being misunderstood by 
others was also pivotal to the participants 
experience of their illness.  The notion that 
“nobody really knows anything about these 
illnesses”, and the felt necessity to “explain” to 
others so that they may understand, were 
expressed throughout the interviews.  The 
participants therefore experienced a sense of 
being detached from others through being 
misinterpreted and misunderstood by the other.  
5) The experience of being wrong and being 
different from the other, the experience of having 
to explain oneself to the other so as to avoid 
rejection and so as to be understood by the other, 
the experience of being misread and 
misinterpreted by the other in terms of the 
confines of the diagnosis, were seen as central to 
the participants experience of their  label.  And 
the effect of such experiences, as has been 
shown, is a sense of loneliness, detachment, and 
disconnection from others and from being-with-
others.  The existence of the labelled individual is 
a lonely existence.  A dislocated existence.  An 
estranged existence. 
Finalé: 
The relationship of the labelled individuals to 
other individuals was read in terms of Jean-Paul 
Sartre’s construction of being-for-others; Martin 
Buber’s construction of the I-thou relationship; 
and Erich Fromm’s notion of the asymmetrical 
relationship.  It was seen that the participants, in 
terms of their being-labelled, exist in relation to 
others as an object for the other’s interpretation.  
The label is present as an object within the 
individual’s subjectivity.  That individual is 
understood and related to by the other in terms of 
the diagnostic object, and the individual’s 
subjectivity is devaluated through his or her 
being understood and related to only in terms of 
the diagnostic object.  The individual becomes 
the diagnosis, the condition, the disorder.  It is in 
this sense that the labelled individual exists in 
relation to the other in the mode of a being-in-
itself, a being-in-the-mode-of-an-object.  And it 
is thus that the individual, in relation to others, is 
robbed of his or her subjectivity 
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